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CASE COMMENTS
CoNsTrIUoNAL LAw-DUE PlOCESS-PnOSECUNION'S Wrr.ioL)-

ING EvIDENcE FAVORABLE TO DEFENDNT HE=D

VIoLATIV.-D was

indicted for the murder of his wife. At the trial he admitted the
killing but claimed it occurred in a fit of passion when he discovered
his wife kissing one X late at night in a parked car. X the only
eye witness to the killing, testified that there had been no illicit
relations between D's wife and himself. D was found guilty of
murder with malice and was sentenced to death, and the conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. 294 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 1956).
D asked the trial court to issue a writ of habeas corpus claiming he had been denied a fair trial. At a hearing on the petition, X
confessed giving false testimony at the trial and having had sexual
intercourse with D's wife on several occasions and testified he had
informed the prosecutor of this before the trial. The prosecutor
corroborated this statement, but the trial court refused to issue the
writ; and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, that D was
not accorded due process of law, since, had X not testified falsely
with the prosecutor's knowledge, the jury might have accepted
D's defense, thereby reducing his offense to murder without malice
and precluding the death penalty. Reversed and remanded.
Alcorta v. Texas, 78 Sup. Ct. 103 (1957).
It was made clear in the principal case that D had exhausted
all of his remedies in the state courts. This is an essential allegation, for orderly procedure requires that before a United States
court is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus in the case of a
person held under a state commitment, recourse should be had to
all judicial remedies afforded by the state. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254
(1948); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944); Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1934); United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195
F.2d 815 (3rd Cir. 1952). This principle is only a side issue so far
as this comment is concerned; however, it is a very essential element in a case of this nature.
The primary problems to be considered here are the principal
duty of the prosecutor when trying a case and the limitations on
his actions in carrying out this duty. Undoubtedly, his first and
foremost duty "is not to convict, but to see that justice is done.
The suppression of facts or the secreting of witnesses capable of
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establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible."
American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 5
(1957); see also the Code of Professional Ethics governing West
Virginia attorneys. 128 W. Va. XXI (1947). In a criminal trial
the prosecuting attorney occupies a quasi-judicial position. State v.
Seckman, 124 W. Va. 740, 22 S.E.2d 374 (1942). He "may prosecute
vigorously, so long as he deals fairly with the accused; but he
should never become a partisan, intent only on conviction."
State v. Hively, 103 W. Va. 237, 136 S.E. 862 (1927). Mr. Justice
Sutherland, in explaining the duties and obligations of a United
States attorney in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935),
observed:
"The United States Attorney is the representative not of
an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all.... As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.
But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."
The question considered in the principal case, the suppression
of evidence by the prosecution in criminal cases as vitiating the
conviction, is one upon which there is little authority. The few
cases on the subject, with apparently one exception, hold or recognize that the suppression of evidence favorable to the accused by
the prosecution is a denial of due process of law, entitling the accused to release from custody. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213 (1942);
Mooney v. Holohan, supra; United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,
supra; Woollomes v. Heinze, 198 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1952); United
States ex rel. Montgomery v. Rogen, 86 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill.
1949); Curtis v. Rives, 123 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Ex parte
Lindley, 29 Cal. App. 2d 709, 177 P.2d 918 (1947). But of. Wallace v. Foster,206 Ga. 561, 57 S.E.2d 920 (1950). See also, Annot.,
33 A.L.R.2d 1421 (1954).
The term, due process, identifies itself with the due course of
proceedings in the administration of justice, thereby protecting the
defendant from partisan actions on the part of the prosecuting
attorney. This protection does not extend to every partisan act,
however, for, if every such act of the state's attorney were to vitiate
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a conviction, the efficient administration of criminal justice would
be seriously impaired. For example, there is no duty upon a
prosecutor to present a question to the court which an intelligent
and well represented defendant does not see fit to raise in his own
behalf. United States v. Sobell, 142 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
The evil which the courts should and apparently do attempt to
meet is not partisanship per se but deceit and dishonesty. See
Comment, 62 HAIv. L. REv. 1284 (1949).
There can be no doubt that suppression by the prosecutor of
evidence that is favorable to the defendant is a deceitful and dishonest practice, and while the courts look upon such conduct with
disfavor and while the Canons of Professional Ethics, supra, condemn the practice, no case is found in which a prosecuting attorney
has been removed from office or otherwise disciplined on such
ground. See 27 C.J.S., District and Prosecuting Attorneys § 7
(1941).
In West Virginia a prosecutor may be removed from office for
"official misconduct, incompetence, neglect of duty, or gross immorality." W. VA. CONST. art. IV, § 6. W. VA. CODE c. 6, art. 6,
§ 7 (Michie 1955), provides the procedure for such removal. Al.
though there are no cases so holding, it would seem that in West
Virginia, on the basis of the decisions cited herein, if a prosecutor
withheld evidence favorable to the defendant, his action would
amount to a neglect of his primary duty, e.g., to see that justice
is done. There is a strong basis for the belief that his neglect
would, in turn, be ground for removal from office.
T. E. P.
CoNsTrrUTONAL LA--EQUAL PFOTECMON OF THE LAWs-STATE
EREGuLAnON OF MoNEY ORDER AGENCIE.-The Illinois Community

Currency Exchange Act, having as its purpose the protection of the
public, required all firms selling or issuing money orders within
the state to secure a license and to submit to specified restrictive
regulations. The American Express Company, being of unquestionable solvency, was specifically exempted under the act. P, a
competing money order agency, contended that the exemption constituted a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Held, affirming the district court, that the relationship
of the statutory classification to the purpose of the act was too
remote, and in effect created a closed class favoring a named cor-
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